I. SEGREGATION OF DUTIES AND INSIDER THREATS
Cyber-attacks are a challenge to many organizations for whom network connectivity is a major support to the business. Cyber threats come from organized crime units who specifically target certain organizations, as well as from opportunistic individuals including contractors and internal employees. Regardless of the threat source, these attacks have implications for the organizations targeted, including the waste of valuable time in conducting security investigations and forensic analysis, in recovering from successful intrusions and in addressing subsequent regulatory implications. There is also the potential for damage to reputation and loss of shareholder trust.
For the purposes of this paper, we consider an 'insider' of an organization to be a person who has somelevel of access to the IT systems of the organization. Insiders are usually employees, contractors, consultants or personnel from thirdparty service providers who would have been granted legitimate access to IT systems [1] . An insider threat could arise from anyone in these categories because these people have knowledge of the internal IT system and sometimes of the security controls protecting it [2] [3] .
In many cases of insider-generated cyber-attacks, the perpetrator is someone already known to the organization. According to a global survey of over 10,000 senior company members located in the Americas, Europe, Africa, the Middle East and the Asia-Pacific regions conducted by PricewaterhouseCoopers in 2003 [4] , current and former employees remain the highest internal threat source.
Results of the survey demonstrate that attacks originating from the internal network often develop from misuse of user privileges that have been granted to internal employees. In fact, the 2012 annual Data Breach Investigations Report by Verizon [5] highlighted that although the trend of insider attacks on organizations was decreasing, one of the main sources of breaches is from "abuse of system access privileges".
The survey results demonstrate that one of the major challenges many organizations face is controlling who has access to fundamental systems and applications and allocating appropriate privileges to people to support them in performing their duties.
Segregation-of-duties (SoD) is a type of internal control many organizations implement to minimize the risk of fraudulent activities. It is designed to reduce the opportunity for fraudulent activities [6] [7] . When properly implemented, it ensures that no individual can complete a critical business process from start to finish. It is also designed to ensure that users cannot execute multiple transactions resulting in conflict from a SOD standpoint, such as allowing a user to create a fictitious or fraudulent entry using one transaction, and the same user to conceal the fraud using another transaction [8] .
According to Ernst & Young [7] , the key reasons for SoD breaches include: (1) complexity and variety of the systems to implement it, (2) lack of ownership and accountability for controlling the processes, and (3) lack of proper checks and balances.
In the next section, we explore the current prevention and detection mechanisms designed to address the issue with SoD conflicts. This is followed by a case study describing how a breach of SoD enables an insider to attack a company, accompanied by discussion of what happened and how it could have been avoided. In this section, we explore the current prevention and detection mechanisms designed to address SoD conflicts.
A. Adoption of Industry-accepted Security Management
Framework A widely accepted approach is the adoption of good practices in information security management. ISO 27001 (based on the earlier version, ISO 17799) is the dominant security standard used by many organizations in information security management. This standard has a set of security controls designed to address the risk to information and information systems security.
B. Use of Deliberate Markers
It was noted by Schultz [1] that little progress has been made in regards to stopping internal attackers. Schultz attributed this problem to the lack of substantial understanding of the 'insider threat' [1] . In Schultz's paper, he indicated that what might be a promising approach in detecting and predicting insider attacks is the use of multiple regression techniques, utilizing a combination of behavioral and psychological attributes such as deliberate markers, meaningful errors, preparatory behaviors, verbal behaviors, correlated usage, and personality traits.
C. Implement an Audit System
King and Parulekar in their paper in 2004 [9] stated the need for an audit system that would enable an enterprise to determine a comprehensive set of incompatible functions. This was in response to the prominent corporate scandals surrounding the 2002 period. In their paper in 2004, King and Parulekar discussed an audit system, designed for segregation-of-duties reporting. This audit system could also verify the validity of segregation of incompatible functions, generate alerts when incompatible functions are assigned to the same individual, and further prevent access to incompatible functions.
D. Synergies between Technical And Procedural Processes, and Use of Neural And Statistical Methods
David [8] proposed a method based on Enterprise Planning Systems that would use a combination of procedural and technical processes to detect fraud. The paper [10] offered a comparison between utilizing neural networks and Bayesian methods in computer-related fraud detection.
E. Addressing SoD in ERP Systems
Proctor, Heiser, and MacDonald [11] discussed the following three techniques to address SoD conflicts in ERP systems: identifying and reducing conflicts at the applicationlevel using functional permissions; integration with existing user provisioning and role management processes; automatically monitoring for transactions that indicate inappropriate behaviour.
F. Use behavioral Attributes to Tag Individuals
Although most current approaches in detecting insider threats are technical in nature, [12] argued that individuals with certain attributes are more likely to commit fraud than people who do not possess these attributes, and suggested to supplement technology-related controls with behavioral attributes and utilize personal background information by assigning 'tags' to internal employees which could include information about their financial, credit and bankruptcy history. The authors of [13] augmented this idea by proposing the addition of psychological attributes of people. In addition, it was suggested in [14] that behavioral and sociological aspects be considered to strengthen the defenses against insider attacks.
G. Audit Reporting
Many companies rely on audit reporting, where management is trained to use a software package that generates reports of conflicting duties [15] . The software packages available today, although preventive in nature, also have detection capability in the form of reporting. Reporting is manually invoked, and is usually performed at given time intervals, thus, this model does not provide for real-time detection of SoD conflicts.
III. ABS BANKING COPORATION -A CASE STUDY ON SOD CONFLICTS
A survey conducted by Gramling, Hermanson, Hermanson, and Yeregarding the nature of SoD weaknesses highlighted that the most common areas in accounting affected by the lack of SoD include cash disbursements, cash accounts, payables and receivables, purchase, and period-end closing [16] .
The following case study illustrates how a SoD conflict was used to commit fraud during the purchasing process.
A. Company Background
ABS Banking Corporation(ABS) is a small-sized financial institution operating in the South East Asia region consisting of over500 employees.To assist operational management in purchasing any resource required to support its function, ABS uses a centralized purchasing IT system that is located in its headquarters in Singapore.
B. ABS' Purchasing Process
The purchasingprocess at ABS is composed of 8 key phasesand has defined rules (see Table 1 ) that must be followed when provisioning users to create a purchase order. This rule matrix is designed to minimize the risk of employee errors or deliberate and unauthorized transactions when processing purchase orders. The tasks which are marked 'X' mean they are conflicting duties. Therefore, users must not be assigned both of the corresponding tasks. This approach is aligned with [9] in which a list of incompatible functions is maintained.
The standard process for buying goods or services by employees on behalf of ABS Banking Corporation is illustrated in Figure 1 
